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Using only two risk types in the Stiglitz-Weiss model it turns out that the return
function for banks has to be double hump-shaped. We derive the demand for loans
and the supply of loans and ￿nd that loans are provided at two interest rates in
equilibrium. The safe borrowers are rationed at the lower interest rate, whereas the
risky borrowers are not rationed at all. Compared to the existing literature this
suggests that the more heterogenous the risk types are, the less credit is rationed.
However, credit-rationing persists in equilibrium as long as we consider a discrete
number of types.
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11 Introduction
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that information on credit markets is asymmetric and not
available to everyone. This concept is widely accepted in the literature with important
implications for the supply of loans in equilibrium on credit markets. Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) ￿nd that banks cannot observe the risk types of borrowers and have to lend at an
average interest rate, at which all risk types demand loans. Thus, the demand for loans
exceeds the supply of loans in equilibrium and random credit rationing takes place for
all risk types. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) use a two risk type setup and a hump-shaped
return function for banks. More recently, Arnold and Riley (2009) challenge the results
from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). They use a continuum of risk types and a monotonic
increasing return function for banks.1 They ￿nd that in equilibrium loans are given at,
at least, two interest rates and show numerically that "...rationing is unlikely." (Arnold
and Riley, 2009, p2012).2
The results by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and by Arnold and Riley (2009) describe two
special cases of rationing on credit markets. Our paper shows that there exist intermediate
solutions. We analyse the Stiglitz-Weiss model for two risk types, but with a double hump-
shaped return function for banks. We ￿nd rationing exists in equilibrium, which is neither
as much as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) not as little as in Arnold and Riley (2009). Certain
risk types are rationed and others are not.
The actors in our model are borrowers and banks. The borrowers invest in a project
that could be either safe or risky, depending on their risk type. They demand loans from
banks and post collateral to secure their loans. If the project succeeds the borrowers
receive the return and repay the loans and the interest. Otherwise, if the project fails, the
borrowers are not able to repay the loans and loose their collateral. First, we consider the
optimal behaviour of borrowers and derive the demand function for loans. The borrowers
maximize their return and demand loans as long as their expected return is non-negative.
In a second step, we consider the behaviour of banks. As we assume imperfect markets
with asymmetric information, banks cannot observe the risk type of borrowers. They give
loans at an average interest rate. We assume that the banks lend loans (loan-subgame)
before they re￿nance (deposit-subgame).3 The expected return function for banks, which
turns out to be double hump-shaped (Coco, 1997), re￿ ects the supply of loans. Finally,
we combine the demand function and the supply function and observe di⁄erent equilibria.
Subsequently, we test whether these equilibria are competitive and Pareto optimal.
We ￿nd a competitive equilibrium exists and loans are provided at two di⁄erent interest
rates. The safe types are rationed at the lower interest rate, whereas risky types are not
rationed at all. In our model we show that between the rationing of all risk types (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981) and the complete removal of credit rationing (Arnold and Riley, 2009)
1In a footnote Arnold and Riley (2009) mention the discrete two borrower case with a double hump-
shaped return function for banks. See Steger and Waelde (2007) for a formal model.
2Arnold (2010) provides a game-theoretic foundation for the results in Arnold and Riley (2009).
3For a survey on the ordering of the subgames see Arnold (2010).
2intermediate solutions exist, where only certain types are rationed. This suggests that
the more heterogenous the types are, the less credit is rationed in equilibrium.
In the literature, the discussion of rationing on credit markets started when Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) posed the question: ￿Why is credit rationed?￿ . This work has had a wide
in￿ uence for the future macroeconomic modeling with credit rationing, see Bester (1985)
and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987). The bank￿ s expected return function receives special
attention. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) recognize that the return function for banks could be
double hump-shaped and a second interest rate might appear in equilibrium. Surprisingly,
they conclude that this double hump-shape is very unlikely and that the return function
must be hump-shaped with a global maximum at the lower interest rate. They reject the
second interest rate as very unlikely. Most of the literature, even textbooks, take this
assumption as given, like Blanchard and Fisher (1989), Hillier and Ibrahimo (1993), De
Meza and Webb (1987, 1992), Hellmann and Stiglitz (2002) and Suominen (2004). Other
economists like Hillier (1997) and Walsh (2001) assume the double hump-shaped return
function for banks, but remain with the one-interest rate equilibrium. Coco (1997, 1999)
and, more recently, Arnold and Riley (2009) prove that there must be more than one local
maxima for the expected return function. Arnold and Riley (2009) go further and show
that a monotonic increasing return function results if they assume a continuum of types.
This a⁄ects the results from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and has important consequences
for the existence of credit rationing on credit markets.
Our paper takes into account of the two risk type setup with a double hump-shaped re-
turn function for banks, an issue that was not considered by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and
by Arnold and Riley (2009). We present this missing consideration in a game-theoretical
model and show that there are more general solutions than the solutions presented in
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and in Arnold and Riley (2009).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows the Stiglitz-Weiss model and
the modi￿cation of the return function for banks. In section 3 we consider the optimal
behaviour of borrowers and banks. The equilibrium, and the deviations from it, will be
studied in section 4. The results are shown in section 5. A short conclusion closes the
paper.
2 The model
We have risk-neutral borrowers and banks. There are two types of borrowers, the safe
type denoted as i = 1 and the risky type denoted as i = 2. The number of safe investors
is N1 and the number of risky borrowers is N2. Each of these borrowers has one project
to undertake. The project is either safe or risky, which is de￿ned by the type of borrower.
We have to mention that safe project does not mean that there is no risk in the project. It
only means that the probability of success for the ￿rst type is higher than the, exogenously
given, probability of success for projects of the second type. We consider an one period
model. At the beginning of the period the investment is made. The total amount for
3the investment, B, has to be borrowed from a bank and collateral, C, is given, where
0 < C < B. We assume the investment, B, to be indivisible. We exclude that a whole
group of similar borrowers receives only a part of the amount of the demanded loan,
described as credit rationing of type one by Keeton (1979). In our model only randomly
chosen borrowers are denied loan. At the end of the period, the borrower receives a
payo⁄ Ri ￿ 0. If the projects succeed, the return for type 1 borrower is R1 and the
return for type 2 is R2. The payo⁄ in the failure of the project is zero and the borrower
loses all her collateral. The probabilities of success are p1 and p2 respectively, where
0 < p2 < p1 < 1. With (1 ￿ pi) the project fails. Both projects have the same expected
return, E(Ri) = piRi = R. Thus, by assuming p1 > p2 it follows that R1 < R2. If
R > (1 + ri)B at the end of the period, the borrower has to repay the amount of loan,
B, including an interest rate, ri, to the bank.
We assume at least four banks in the model denoted by k = 1;:::;K where 4 ￿ K ￿ 1.
Two banks o⁄ering multiple credit contracts would also be su¢ cient, but to assume there
are four banks simpli￿es the consideration. Two banks o⁄ering multiple credit contracts
would also be su¢ cient, but to assume there are four banks simpli￿es the consideration.
We assume a bank collects deposits to the price of ￿k and gives loan to the price of rk.
The supply of deposits on the capital market, given by Ls(￿), is assumed to be monotonic
and strictly increasing in ￿. Furthermore, the banks are assumed to compete in prices
(Bertrand, 1883). It is therefore necessary that at least two banks compete at each interest
rate.
In order to get a competitive solution, the loan-subgame precedes the deposit-subgame
(Stahl, 1988). In the loan-subgame, the loan market is characterized by asymmetric
information. This means that banks have no information about the borrower￿ s risk type.
Interest rates cannot be conditioned on the borrower￿ s risk type. The borrowers start
applying for loan at the lowest interest rate. If they do not receive a loan at this interest
rate, they try to get loan at the next possible, higher, interest rate in the market, given
that their expected pro￿t is non-negative. The bank k acts with (rk;￿k) ￿ (0;0), where
rk is the interest rate and ￿k is the credit ceiling up to which the bank is willing to lend
at interest rate rk. If there is more than one bank o⁄ering loan at the same interest rate,
rk, the one with the highest credit ceiling, ￿k, serves the whole demand. If several banks
bid the same credit ceiling at the same interest rate the bank which serves the market is
chosen by a random tie-breaking rule, with the same probability for each bank. However,
at each interest rate, only one bank gives capital to the borrowers. If the credit ceiling,
￿k, of the chosen bank is not high enough to satisfy the whole demand, loan is rationed
at this interest rate. This rationing is random, because banks cannot observe the type of
the borrower. The loan really given at an interest rate is Lrn.
Subsequently, the deposit-subgame takes place. The banks act with (￿k;￿k) ￿ (0;0).
The deposit rate the bank is willing to pay is ￿k and ￿k is the quantity of deposits the
bank is willing to collect. Because of the timing of this game, the deposit-subgame follows
the loan-subgame, the amount of deposits which the bank collects would be the same as
the amount of loans it gives. The bank collects deposits in order of decreasing deposit
4rates, ￿k. If the depositor cannot place the desired amount at the bank, she has to decide
either to save at the next lower rate or not at all. If supply equals demand at a deposit
rate ￿k, every bank collects the demanded amount of deposits. In the case of excess
supply, the depositors are randomly rationed. If there is higher demand of deposits than
supply of deposits, each bank receives a proportional amount of the quantity it demands.
Additionally, we assume that there is no secondary market for deposits at which a bank
has the possibility of re￿nancing. If a bank fails to re￿nance, this leads to an in￿nitely
negative pro￿t. The bank promises an amount of loan to the borrowers and could not
collect the capital it needs to distribute the promised amount of capital. On the other
hand, collecting an amount of deposits without giving loan, leads to a negative pro￿t
which is not in￿nite. The loss equals the amount of the deposit rates the bank has to pay
to the exceeded depositors. In our model, however, we assume that a bank never fails to
re￿nance the loan, if it o⁄ers a su¢ ciently high deposit rate ￿k.
3 Optimality conditions
3.1 The optimal behaviour of borrowers
An entrepreneur could either provide capital to a bank as a depositor or demand capital
from a bank as a borrower. Depositors want to save their money at the highest possible
interest rate to maximize their pro￿ts. If they are unable to safe the amount of money at
the highest interest rate, ￿n, they can try to invest the money at the next lower interest
rate, ￿n￿1. Entrepreneurs will supply capital as long as they have stored all their money
or as long as they ￿nd another, more pro￿table, project. We can order deposit rates as
￿1 > ￿2 > ::: > ￿N where N is the number of market deposit rates at which deposits are
raised, Dn > 0. As those actions of the depositors are straightforward and we furthermore
assume that a bank never fails to re￿nance, we will not deepen this consideration here.
On the other hand entrepreneurs can demand loans from a bank as borrowers. The
pro￿t for a borrower is the maximum of either the return minus the repayment to the
bank, loan and interest, or the loss of the collateral as ￿(Ri;r) = max(Ri ￿ (1 + r)B;￿C)
where i = 1;2. The borrower applies for loan if her expected pro￿t is non-negative. We
use the ￿epsilon altruism￿ designed by Hillier (1997). He shows that if investors are
indi⁄erent about investing or not, they choose to invest into the project, as this would be
welfare increasing for the economy. However, the expected pro￿t of a borrower is given
as
E[￿(Ri;r)] = R ￿ pi(1 + r)B ￿ (1 ￿ pi)C ￿ 0. (1)
We ￿nd that the expected pro￿t from a risky project is larger than the expected pro￿t
from a safe project only if C < (1 + r)B. This appears to be true for all non-negative





R ￿ (1 ￿ p1)C
p1B
￿ 1 (2)




R ￿ (1 ￿ p2)C
p2B
￿ 1. (3)
We ￿nd that r￿ < rmax. This is proven in appendix A.
To describe the form of the demand function of capital, we calculate which borrowers
are demanding loans if the interest rate r0 is appearing in di⁄erent intervals. If 0 ￿ r0 ￿ r￿
all borrowers demand loan. If r￿ < r0 ￿ rmax only risky borrower demand loan. At the
point rmax, the following equation for the expected pro￿t of a risky investor holds
E[￿(R2;r
max)] = p2[R2 ￿ (1 + r
max)B] ￿ (1 ￿ p2)C = 0. (4)
It becomes clear that rmax is the highest possible interest rate at which borrowers apply
for loan. So if rmax < r0 no borrower is demanding loan anymore. It follows that the






N1 + N2; for 0 ￿ r0 ￿ r￿
N2; for r￿ < r0 ￿ rmax
;; for rmax < r0.
(5)
This formulation of the demand function for capital assumes that no loan is given yet.
If we look at the residual demand of capital we have to di⁄erentiate this expression from
the demand function of capital. The residual demand function consists of the demand at a
special interest rate after loan was given at lower interest rates. We ￿nd that the residual
demand function is also changing at r￿ and rmax, even if there is no loan given at all. At
interest rates larger than r￿, all safe borrowers drop out. At interest rates above rmax all
risky borrower stop demanding capital. We have to check whether the residual demand
function at higher interest rates is changing if loan is given at lower interest rates. To do
so we denote residual demand at rn, an interest rate at which loan is given, as lD(rn).
The loan given at rn is denoted as Lrn. With r￿ < r￿￿ < rmax, we ￿nd if no loan is given


















where Lr￿ as loan given at r￿. Now, let loan be given at r￿ < r￿￿ and r0 < r￿￿. Thus, the















Equation (6) and equation (7) are obvious. The proof of equation (8) is shown in appendix
B. We show the functional form of the residual demand of capital in ￿gure 1.
Figure 1 Residual demand function at r￿￿ in the case r￿ < r0 < r￿￿
We can apply some simpli￿cations at the residual demand function if we consider the
residual demand for only two types of borrowers. If r0 < r￿ the demand for loan at r0 is
equal to the demand for loans at r￿. Knowing this, we can write the residual demand at

















￿) ￿ Lr0. (10)
Thus, we ￿nd the residual demand at r￿ is given by the demand at r￿ minus the loan
given at r0.
















7We ￿nd residual demand at r0 is equal to the residual demand at r￿￿ before any loan is











￿￿) ￿ Lr0 (12)
= l
D (r
0) ￿ Lr0. (13)
We therefore can see that the residual demand at r￿￿ is given by the residual demand at
r0 minus the loan given at r0 for a two borrower type setup.
3.2 The optimal behaviour of banks
The repayment the bank receives is the minimum of the repayment of the loan including
interest or, if the project fails, the collateral,
min((1 + r)B;Ri + C). (14)
Thus, the return of a project can be written as the sum of the repayment a bank receives
and the pro￿t for the borrower as
Ri = min((1 + r)B;Ri + C) + ￿(Ri;r). (15)
We ￿nd, the more the bank gets, the less the investor receives and vice versa. The bank
cannot distinguish between the types of borrowers, but it knows that borrowers only apply
for loan if their expected pro￿t is non-negative, E[￿(Ri;r)] ￿ 0 with i = 1;2.
Considering r < r￿, we know both types of borrowers invest in their project and
demand loan. Hence, the expected pro￿t for a bank is given by
E(￿bjr￿r￿) =
P2








The return function for a bank gives the rate of return given the amount of given loan














Until r = r￿ all borrower types demand loan. The return function of a bank, %(r),
is increasing in the interest rate until it reaches its local maximum value at r￿ with
8%(r￿) = ￿￿. At values above r￿, the expected pro￿t of a safe borrower becomes negative
and she leaves the market. As of now, only risky borrowers demand loan, because they can
still achieve positive expected pro￿ts. Thus, in the interval r￿ < r ￿ rmax the expected
repayment for a bank is given by















Henceforward, the return function is continuous increasing in the interest rate until r =
rmax. The expected pro￿t for the residual risky borrowers is decreasing in r and at r = rmax
it equals zero. The return for the banks at r = rmax equals %(rmax) = R=B ￿ 1. This
return for the bank is larger than the return at r ￿ r￿, shown in equation (17). Looking
at equation (15), we see that the bank receives the whole return from the project. At
interest rates larger than rmax, even risky borrowers do not demand loan anymore. Since
the bank￿ s return function achieves its highest level at the maximum interest rate rmax,
there is an interest rate, r0, in the interval r￿ < r0 ￿ rmax at which the return has to equal
￿￿. Hence, %(r￿) = %(r￿￿) = ￿￿. At interest rates r￿￿ < r0 ￿ rmax banks get higher returns
than in the interval r0 ￿ r￿. We illustrate the double hump-shaped return function for a
bank in the following ￿gure 2.
Figure 2 Double hump-shaped return function for banks
94 Which equilibrium will appear?
Taking the demand function for capital shown in ￿gure (1) and the return function for a
bank, i.e. the supply of capital, in ￿gure (2) we can consider three di⁄erent allocations
and the resulting equilibria.
The ￿rst equilibrium is described by a supply of capital at the interest rate ￿￿ that
is higher than the demand at interest rate r￿, so that LS(￿￿) > LD(r￿). Here, we result
in a market clearing equilibrium for r0 < r￿ with ￿ < ￿￿. No borrower is rationed. This
allocation is shown in ￿gure 3.
Figure 3 Market clearing equilibrium with an equilibrium interest rate r0 < r￿
The second possible equilibrium is characterized by an intersection of demand and
supply in the higher part of the demand function, 0 < LS(￿￿) < LD(rmax). Also, in this
case, we consider a market clearing equilibrium. However, the equilibrium is now located
at interest rates r0 > r￿ with ￿ > ￿￿. Only risky borrowers demand and receive loan. We
show this equilibrium graphically in ￿gure 4.
10Figure 4 Market clearing equilibrium with r￿ < r0 < rmax
As we focus on an equilibrium with credit rationing in this model, we assume a supply
of loan that lies between the above described equilibria with LD(rmax) < LS(￿￿) < LD(r￿)
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) as shown in ￿gure 5.
Figure 5 The two-interest rate equilibrium
First, we have to explain why a one interest allocation is no equilibrium in this case.
As we know a bank receives at least the same return at interest rates larger r￿￿ than at
r￿. It follows therefore that it is not possible to serve borrowers only at r￿, where they
11are randomly rationed. Due to positive residual demand at interest rates above r￿, the
bank could achieve positive pro￿ts by o⁄ering small amounts of loan close to the return
maximizing interest rate rmax. That is why an allocation with a single equilibrium interest
rate at r￿ could not be an equilibrium. Another possible equilibrium could be one, where
loans are only given at rmax. At this point, the supply of loan is higher than the demand.
But also this allocation is not an equilibrium. Another bank could o⁄er loan at an interest
rate slightly lower than rmax skim the whole demand and realize positive pro￿ts.
To show the two-interest rate equilibrium, we assume banks raise deposits LS(￿￿) by
paying the deposit rate ￿￿ to depositors and loan is given at two interest rates, r￿ and
r￿￿. Furthermore, we think of a demand that is exceeding supply at the lower interest
rate, but not at the higher so that LD(r￿￿) < LS(￿￿) < LD(r￿). Finally, we assume
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LD(r￿￿). Banks give loan Lr￿ at interest rate r￿
and satisfy the whole demand LS(￿￿) ￿ Lr￿ at interest rate r￿￿. They receive the return
%(r￿) = %(r￿￿) = ￿￿ from borrowers at both interest rates. Recall, we assume that the loan-
subgame precedes the deposit-subgame and that at least two banks at each equilibrium
interest rate o⁄er loan. The following theorem states that the two-interest rate allocation
is equilibrium in the model.
Theorem 1 In the loan-subgame, at least two banks set (rk;￿k) = (r￿;Lr￿), while at least
two other banks set (rk;￿k) = (r￿￿;LS(￿￿) ￿ Lr￿). In the deposit-subgame, the bank that
serves the loan demand at r￿ sets (￿k;￿k) = (￿￿;Lr￿) and the bank that gives loan at r￿￿
sets (￿k;￿k) = (￿￿;LS(￿￿) ￿ Lr￿). For all other banks which are not giving loan choosing
(￿k;￿k) = (0;0) is optimal.
We prove the theorem by showing that it is not pro￿table for any bank to deviate from
these strategies. First, we consider the deposit-subgame. We notice that the amount of
deposits a bank has to raise to re￿nance itself is already determined in the loan-subgame.
We assume a deposit rate, ~ ￿, exists such that the amount of deposits raised at this rate
is su¢ cient to re￿nance aggregate loan given. Note that ~ ￿ does not necessarily have to
equal ￿￿. It is an optimal strategy for all banks to set (￿k;￿k) = (~ ￿;lk). A bid of ￿k < ~ ￿
or ￿k < lk would lead to a default as banks are not able to re￿nance completely. On the
other hand, by bidding ￿k > ~ ￿ or ￿k > lk, banks would be able to re￿nance. However, this
would raise the cost of re￿nancing to (1+￿k)dk. Since the loan given by the bank and the
revenue is predetermined in the loan-subgame, this strategy is also not pro￿table. Thus,
what happens to the banks that do not bid. The strategy (￿k;￿k) = (0;0) is optimal
12for them, i.e. to raise no deposits. For collected deposits ￿k > 0, the bank would have
to pay ￿k > 0, without getting any revenue from the loan side. A deviation from this
strategy would therefore end up in losses for the bank. It follows that the deposit-subgame
strategies described in the theorem 1 represent a Nash equilibrium.
Now we consider the loan-subgame. For that we take the optimal strategies from
theorem 1 for the deposit-subgame as given. We show that it does not yield positive
expected pro￿ts if banks deviate from the given strategies. The highest credit ceiling
initially set by at least one bank at interest rate rn is denoted as ￿rn. We know a bank
gives loan Lr￿ at r￿ and another bank gives LS(￿￿) ￿ Lr￿ at r￿￿. Suppose that the
corresponding highest credit ceilings, ￿r￿ = Lr￿ and ￿r￿￿ = LS(￿￿) ￿ Lr￿, are initially
o⁄ered by at least two banks at each interest rate. As we assumed loan is only given at
r￿ and r￿￿, no bank o⁄ers a credit ceiling at another interest rate. In the following, we
use the symbol ￿ to denote a change in the variable.
We consider the following two strategies corresponding to aggregate loan given. We
assume (i) a bank makes an additional loan supply at an interest rate r0, at which no
loan is given before, whereas the previous given credit ceilings persist and (ii) a bank
that o⁄ers a higher credit ceiling ￿￿ > 0 than each existing credit ceiling at interest rate
r￿ or r￿￿. The question is how the aggregate loan given ￿(
P
n Lrn) is e⁄ected by these
strategies. We ￿nd that at new interest rates below r￿ or in the situation at which more
loan is supplied at r￿, additional loan given is created. At all other interest rates above
r￿, no additional loan given is created. We prove this in appendix C.
Knowing where additional credit is created and where not, we assume that the strate-
gies named in theorem 1 mean zero pro￿ts for banks. If we could show that there is no
pro￿table derivation, theorem 1 is ful￿lled. We therefore look at the deposit rate the
bank has to pay to its depositors. We have to bear in mind that the bank k is chosen
by a random tie-breaking rule if more than one bank o⁄ers the same credit ceiling at one
interest rate. Thus, we form a function that shows the probability prk for a bank k to be





1; if ￿k > ￿k￿1
1
k; if ￿k = ￿k￿1
0; if ￿k < ￿k￿1.
(22)
If bank k is bidding more loan at interest rate rn than any other bank, it can give loan
with prk = 1. If the bid is equal to other bank￿ s bid the probability to be chosen is 1=k.
If the bank￿ s bid is smaller than all other bids, it will de￿nitely not be chosen. By using
this function we can write the expected pro￿t or a bank k as
E(￿k) = prk%(rk)lk ￿ ￿kdk (23)
where lk is loan given by a bank and dk as the deposits collected by bank. To maximize
their expected pro￿ts, the banks would only collect the amount of deposits they need to
re￿nance its given loans, dk = lk. Hence, we can see that the aggregate deposits collected
from banks can reach the maximum amount of aggregate loan given in the market
P
n Lrn.
13We assume that there is enough supply to satisfy the entire demand at banks. However,
this does not necessarily mean that all borrowers receive loan. With the assumption, we
can conclude that a bank is always able to re￿nance its loan given completely by setting a
su¢ ciently high deposit rate as shown before. Considering ￿ve deviating strategies, shown
in appendix D, we ￿nd that setting (rk;￿k) = (r￿;L￿) or (rk;￿k) = (r￿￿;LS(￿￿) ￿ L￿) in
the loan-subgame is a Nash equilibrium. We have to repeat here that it is necessary that
at each interest rate at least two banks set the credit ceiling as described in the equilibrium
tuple. If one bank deviates from r￿ or r￿￿, there has to be another bank that continues
to o⁄er loan at that interest rate. Otherwise deviating would possibly be pro￿table.
This consideration shows that the two-interest equilibrium given in ￿gure 5 and the-
orem 1 must be the resulting equilibrium for a two borrower case in the Stiglitz-Weiss
model.
5 The safe are rationed, the risky are not
As a ￿rst result we ￿nd, contrary to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), that loans are supplied at
two interest rates in equilibrium. This has important implications on the credit rationing.
At the lower equilibrium interest rate, safe types are rationed and at the higher interest
rate all risky types receive loans. The credit rationing is reduced compared to Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981).
Furthermore, we suggest that credit rationing is decreasing as risk types of borrowers
become more heterogeneous. To prove this statement we look at the Stiglitz-Weiss model
at the one end, the Arnold-Riley model (Arnold and Riley, 2009) at the other end, and
our model in between. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assume two borrower types and a hump-
shaped return function for banks. A single interest rate in equilibrium appears, at which
safe types pay larger interest rates than risk adjusted interest rates would suggest. Finally,
all types are randomly rationed. The result still holds, when Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
relax their assumption of only two borrower types and replace it by a continuum of risk
types. Arnold and Riley (2009) reconsider the assumption of a continuum of risk types to
prove that the shape of the return function for banks has to be monotonic. They describe
an equilibrium where loans are supplied at, at least, two interest rates. They argue that
"...rationing is hard to explain using this model." (Arnold and Riley, 2009, p2013). In
our model, we consider two risk types and are therefore faced to a double hump-shaped
return function for banks. We observe an equilibrium in which loan is supplied at two
interest rates. Only safe borrowers are rationed at the lower interest rate, risky borrowers
are not rationed at all. Coming from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) with credit rationing for
all risk types via our model, where only certain types are rationed, to Arnold and Riley
(2009) with not rationing at all, we suggest that credit rationing is declining as risk types
become more heterogenous. However, credit rationing persists in equilibrium as long as
we consider a discrete number of types.
146 Concluding remarks
Our paper presents an extension of the Stiglitz-Weiss model. We consider two borrower
types and as a consequence, the return function for banks becomes double hump-shaped.
We ￿nd that credit rationing exists in equilibrium only for certain risk types. To classify
our ￿ndings, we view our paper as a generalization of the Stiglitz-Weiss model. We show
that between the credit rationing for all types in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and no rationing
at all in Arnold and Riley (2009) intermediate solutions exist. This suggests that the more
heterogenous the borrower types are, the less credit is rationed in equilibrium.
Further research will include an analytical proof for a model with n borrower types,
where n > 2 and n goes to in￿nity, as well as a numerical solution of the discrete risk
type model.
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16A Proof of r￿ < rmax
For r￿ < rmax we get
R ￿ (1 ￿ p1)C
p1B
￿ 1 <
R ￿ (1 ￿ p2)C
p2B
￿ 1. (24)
Rewriting equation (24) gives
C < R. (25)
As we assume R > B > C, this condition is ful￿lled for all C and R.
B Proof of residual demand at r￿￿
We have to consider two cases. First we assume r￿ < r0 < r￿￿. Using equation (7) the













































































































































which is the same expression as equation (8).
Secondly assuming r0 < r￿ < r￿￿ we have the residual demand at r￿ given a loan given













r￿ (r￿￿) denoting the residual demand at r￿￿ if all demand at r￿ is withdrawn, then









































































































which is equal to equation (8).
C Consideration of the possibility of creating addi-
tional loan in the loan-subgame
Generally, we can conclude, that when we assume the existence of a residual demand, a
supply of loan at new interest rates, ￿￿r0 > 0 results in ￿Lr0 > 0. This leads either to a
rise in the aggregates loan given over all interest rates, ￿(
P
n Lrn) > 0, or to no change
in the aggregate loan given, such that ￿(
P
n Lrn) = 0. This will be explained below. If
there is no residual demand, an increase of the credit ceiling at existing interest rates,
￿￿rn > 0 implies no new loan is given at new interest rates, ￿Lr0 = 0, and thus there is
no change in the aggregate loan given, ￿(
P
n Lrn) = 0.
Now we go deeper into the matter. A bank o⁄ers loan at an interest rate, at which
no loan is given before. The following ￿gure 6 provides a graphical illustration of ￿ve
possible cases we have to look at.
Figure 6 Illustration of the ￿ve possible cases in the ￿rst strategy
Cases one, two and three correspond to the ￿rst strategy, which means o⁄ering addi-
tional loan at new interest rates. Cases four and ￿ve are connected to the o⁄er of a higher
19credit ceiling at existing equilibrium interest rates. Table 1 shows the ￿rst three possible
cases that occur using the ￿rst strategies mentioned above.
￿rn=rn r0 < r￿ r￿ < r0 < r￿￿ r0 > r￿￿ ￿(
P
n Lrn) > 0
Initial case 0 0 0 -
Case (1) ￿r0 > 0 0 0 yes
Case (2) 0 ￿r0 > 0 0 no
Case (3) 0 0 ￿r0 > 0 no
Table 1 the credit ceiling corresponding to o⁄ering additional loan at new interest rates
In case (1), we look at interest rates r0 that are lower than r￿. We assume a constant
demand for loan as the demand function is a stepwise one, such that LD(r0) = LD(r￿).
In the following we will consider three subcases depending on the amount of new loan
o⁄ered. In case (a), we assume a persistent residual demand at r￿￿, in case (b), we show
the situation in which there is no residual demand above r￿, and in case (c), we describe
the case in which there is no residual demand even above r0. We will keep this notation
also in the other cases, in order to give the consideration more structure. Looking at case
(1a) we ￿nd that the additional supply at r0 is o⁄ered to such an amount that there is
still residual demand at r￿￿. This means that the credit ceiling at the new interest rate is
smaller than the loan demand at r￿ minus the loan given at r￿, so that ￿r0 < LD(r￿)￿Lr￿.
Hence, loan is given at three interest rates, r0, r￿, and r￿￿. loan given at these three interest
rates is then Lr0 = ￿r0 at r0, Lr￿ at r￿, and at r￿￿ loan given has to equal residual demand.
In the beginning this amount was de￿ned as ￿r￿￿ = LS(￿￿) ￿ Lr￿. But now the amount


































￿￿) = ￿r￿￿ (37)











The additional supply at r0 leads to additional aggregate loan. Looking at case (1b), no




￿) ￿ Lr￿ ￿ ￿r0 < L
D(r
￿). (39)
20Hence, all the residual demand is satis￿ed at r￿. At interest rates above r￿, residual
demand does not exist anymore and so loan is not given there, as shown in equation (37).
In this case, loan is given at two interest rates, r0 and r￿. Aggregate loan given equals
LD(r￿) which is higher than aggregate loan given before, LS(￿￿). Adverse selection does
not take place. All borrowers receive the amount of capital they demand. Hence, loan
given rises when compared to the initial situation with credit rationing, so that
￿Lr0 > 0 ) ￿(
P
n Lrn) > 0. (40)
Case (1c) describes the situation if the credit ceiling at the new interest rate r0 equals or
exceeds demand at r0. This could be the case if ￿r0 ￿ LD(r￿). Then there is only one
interest rate at which loan is given, i.e. r0. Clearly, this has exactly the same consequences
for aggregate loan given as shown above: ￿(
P
n Lrn) > 0. Summarizing the ￿rst case
yields the result that a bank increases aggregate loan given if it o⁄ers an additional supply
at interest rates below r￿, i.e. ￿Lr0 > 0 ) ￿(
P
n Lrn) > 0. This is due to the positive
residual demand that initially existed at this interval and the persistent loan o⁄ers at r￿
and r￿￿. With the new lower interest rate, the bank attracts all borrowers and credit
rationing is reduced.
In case (2), we look at an additional rate at the interval r￿ < r0 < r￿￿. Demand remains
constant in this interval. Again, we di⁄erentiate if supply is smaller (case (2a)), equal
(case (2b) or larger (case (2c)) than residual demand. In case (2a), the additional supply
at r0 is smaller than the residual demand at this interest rate, i.e. if ￿r0 < LS(￿￿) ￿ Lr￿,
loan is given at three interest rates. The residual demand at the higher rates decreases at
exactly the same amount as additional loan is supplied, i.e. ￿lD(r) = ￿Lr0 for r0. With
the additional loan supply, a bank can only attract borrowers of the risky type, because
safe borrowers do not demand capital at this interest rate interval. So no rationed safe
borrower has an additional chance of getting capital as was the case in case (1). At r￿￿, no
excess demand exists and no selection process is at work. Hence, no additional aggregate
loan is created. loan given is simply redistributed. Some of the risky borrowers simply pay
a lower interest rate than their initial rate, while nothing changes for the safe borrowers.
Hence, ￿r0 > 0 implies ￿Lr0 > 0 and it follows that ￿(
P
n Lrn) = 0. In case (2b), supply
is equal, and in case (2c), supply is higher than the residual demand at r0, the whole
residual demand is satis￿ed at the new interest rate and no residual demand exists at the
higher interest rates. loan is then given at two interest rates, at r￿ and r0. No additional
loan given is created, here either.
If we look at interest rates with r￿￿ < r0, case (3), the same result as in case (2)
prevails. No additional loan is created, but here for another reason. Above r￿￿, no
residual demand exists. Credit ceilings o⁄ered above r￿￿ cannot cause additional loan
given, i.e. ￿r0 > 0 ) ￿Lr0 = 0 ) ￿(
P
n Lrn) = 0.
Now consider the second strategy where we assume that additional loan is o⁄ered at
the existing equilibrium interest rate r￿ or r￿￿. The results are given in table 2.
21￿rn=rn r￿ r￿￿ ￿(
P
n Lrn) > 0
Initial case Lr￿ LS(￿￿) ￿ Lr￿ -
Case (4) ￿r￿ > Lr￿ LS(￿￿) ￿ Lr￿ yes
Case (5) Lr￿ ￿r￿￿ > LS(￿￿) ￿ Lr￿ no
Table 2 The two possible cases corresponding to an increase in the credit ceiling at ex-
isting equilibrium interest rates
First of all we consider case (4) where a bank is o⁄ering additional loan at r￿. Suppose
in case (4a) that the increased credit ceiling the bank o⁄ers is still smaller than the residual
demand at r￿, so that (1 + ￿)￿r￿ < lD(r￿) = LD(r￿). Clearly at r￿ more loan is given
due to of excess demand. But to see what happens with aggregate loan given, we have
to consider if and how loan changes at r￿￿. loan is still given at two interest rates,
Lnew












The value in brackets is larger than zero and smaller than one. So, if the bank increases
the credit ceiling at r￿ such that loan given at r￿ rises by ￿Lr￿, the residual demand
decreases by less than ￿Lr￿. This is again a hint towards the fact that only safe borrowers
are rationed. So there is an increase in total loan given on the market, i.e. ￿Lr￿ > 0 )
￿(
P
n Lrn) > 0. If the new highest credit ceiling at r￿ equals (case (4b)) or exceeds (case
(4c)) demand, loan is only given at that interest rate and no borrower is rationed, i.e.
Lr￿ = LD(r￿) and thus ￿Lr￿ > 0 ) ￿(
P
n Lrn) > 0.
In case (5), a bank o⁄ers a higher credit ceiling at r￿￿. At r￿￿ by assumption, no excess
demand exists. So no additional loan given can be created, as
￿￿r￿￿ > 0 ) ￿Lr￿￿ = 0 ) ￿(
P
n Lrn) = 0. (42)
The bank with the increased credit ceiling simply adopts the role of the bank which was
giving loan at r￿￿.
D Five deviating strategies for a bank
In the following, we have to compare the interest rate rn, deposit rate ￿k and the expected
pro￿t E(￿k) for each case (1) to (5) to ￿nd out if the deviating strategy is optimal or not.
We illustrated this comparison in table 3.
22Case (1) Case (2) Case (3) Case (4) Case (5) P
n Lrn " = = = "
rn < ￿￿ < ￿￿ not possible = ￿￿ = ￿￿
￿k > ￿￿ = ￿￿ not possible = ￿￿ > ￿￿
E(￿k) < 0 < 0 = 0 = 0 < 0
Optimal no no no no no
Table 3 Pro￿t in the ￿ve cases
Looking at case (1) we ￿nd that at new interest rates below r￿, a bank can attract
￿rms by o⁄ering loan. This leads to higher aggregate loan given as shown before. Now
we have to examine how the increase in aggregate loan given a⁄ects the expected pro￿t of
the deviating bank. In the deposit-subgame, the aggregate demand for deposits increases
and the bank would therefore have to pay a higher deposit rate than ￿￿ to prevent default.
Thus in order to achieve zero pro￿ts the bank has to attain a higher return than %(rk) = ￿￿
in the loan-subgame. However, this is not possible for the interval r0 < r￿ if we consider
the assumed shape of the bank￿ s return function. A deviation in the form of case (1) is
not optimal for a bank.
In case (2), loan is o⁄ered at an interest rate r￿ < r0 < r￿￿. We show that aggregate
loan given would remain unchanged because an additional o⁄er only a⁄ects borrowers of
the risky type that are not rationed in equilibrium anyway. However, this case (2) does
not yield positive expected pro￿ts for a bank because its return in this interval %(r0) is
strictly smaller than ￿￿, while it would have to raise funds in the deposit-subgame by
paying exactly ￿￿.
Now consider case (3) where loan is o⁄ered at interest rates r0 > r￿￿. From the
de￿nition of Lr￿ in equation(21), it follows that residual demand equals supply at the
interest rate r￿￿. Thus above r￿￿ there is no residual demand and there is consequently
no possibility to create positive returns.
Setting a higher credit ceiling at r￿ (case 4) leads to an increase in aggregate loan
given and hence it is possible to create positive returns, %(r￿) = ￿￿ in the loan-subgame.
However, expected pro￿t in contrast decreases because the bank would again have to pay
a higher deposit rate (> ￿￿) to re￿nance loan given. Hence, by deviating as in case (4), the
only possibility is to serve some loan demand and not achieve negative expected pro￿ts.
However, even this does not yield positive expected pro￿ts and thus there is no incentive
to deviate from the proposed equilibrium strategy.
Another possibility to deviate from the initial case is shown in case (5). The strategy
consists of setting a higher credit ceiling than the bank that served loan demand at
r￿￿, capturing all the loan demand at this interest rate, and achieving the return rate
%(r￿￿) = ￿￿. This also does not yield positive pro￿ts, instead yielding zero pro￿ts, as
there was no excess demand at r￿￿.
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